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Abstract 
      There are two different views on the effects of public financial institutions on corporate debt 
restructuring: the soft budget view and the hard budget view. The former view, which is held by 
Kornai (1979, 1983), Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), and others insists that because centralized 
public financial institutions have difficulty committing themselves to refrain from providing 
additional funds to distressed firms, corporate reorganizations often result in overinvestment. 
On the other hand, the latter view argues that public financial institutions should prefer 
corporate liquidation rather than the continuation of business because public financial 
institutions are secured by mortgages to a greater extent and are more reluctant to forgive the 
debts than private financial institutions. 
      In this paper, I have empirically examined the role and impact of public financial institutions, 
government-affiliated financial institutions in particular, from the viewpoints of debtor-in- 
possession (DIP) financing and bankruptcy procedures for distressed firms. 
      The conclusions of this paper are as follows. 
   In the DIP financing, the Development Bank of Japan always takes the lead, followed by 
private financial institutions. Namely, so-called cowbell effect may exist, which is inconsistent 
with the hard budget view. Regarding the selection of bankruptcy procedures, firms that owed 
to government-affiliated financial institutions have a tendency to opt for private procedures 
which have the effect of delaying a drastic debt restructuring. This is consistent with the soft 
budget view. 
 
   
 
I.  Introduction 
 
   The problem of financial institutions making additional loans to, or forgiving the debt of, 142  K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 
distressed firms that should otherwise go bankrupt is generally called the soft budget problem. 
      The concept of the soft budget problem was originally proposed by Kornai (1979 and 1983), 
and was used to refer to factors that caused shortages of goods in a socialist economy. However, 
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Qian and Xu (1998), Li (1998), and others have recast the 
concept to refer to a problem that could happen in any centralized economy or the public sector 
in general. For example, Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) explained that when there is only one 
lender (e.g., a financial institution or the government) in a centralized economy, the existence of 
sunk costs (existing loans) could trigger additional loans that may cause overinvestment. Li 
(1998), Shleifer and Vishney (1994), and others have argued that when the public sector has a 
controlling right over a firm, rent-seeking activities by the private sector will bring about a 
possibility for inefficient projects to remain. In either case, the difficulties of committing to 
refrain from implementing inefficient projects cause the soft budget problem. 
   In this paper, I would like to focus on public financial institutions--government-affiliated 
financial institutions in particular—to examine whether the existence of government-affiliated 
financial institutions softens or hardens (i.e., raises the efficiency of) the budget constraints of 
distressed firms. Especially, I will examine influences of the existence of government-affiliated 
financial institutions in DIP financing and the selection of bankruptcy procedures 
1. The 
relationship between corporate debt restructuring and government-affiliated financial 
institutions is important not only when we examine whether such institutions are hard or soft, 
but also when we evaluate    reorganizations led by the Industrial Revitalization Corporation of 
Japan etc. 
      This paper is structured as follows. 
   In Section II, arguments on the soft budget problem in the public sector are discussed and 
their implications to Japanese public financial institutions are considered. In Section III, 
previous studies on DIP financing are reviewed and the role of government-affiliated financial 
institutions, especially the Development Bank of Japan, on DIP financing in Japan are examined. 
Section IV focuses on choices of bankruptcy procedures or debt restructuring methods, 
including legal and private procedures, and on the suitability of a chosen procedure for 
maximizing a firm’s value. I will also discuss the effects of lending by government-affiliated 
financial institutions on the selection of bankruptcy procedures and as well as on the efficiency 




                                                                            
1    In this paper, the question of whether the debt restructuring led by the Industrial Revitalization 
Corporation of Japan is soft or hard is not directly analyzed because there are not enough samples at this 
point. The same applies to the question of debt restructuring in the third sector.   K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 143 
II.    The Public Sector and the Soft Budget Problem 
 
II.1.    The Public Sector and the Soft Budget Problem 
 
   The concept of the soft budget constraint problem is said to have been first introduced by 
Kornai (1979 and 1983). A soft budget constraint refers to a situation where a firm is allowed to 
receive subsidies or additional loans in the amount exceeding the level originally considered 
efficient, regardless of whether the additional funds are from a bank or a government. According 
to Kornai (1983), soft budget constraints in a centralized (socialist) economy can be categorized 
into five categories: (1) discretion in determining prices, (2) discretionary tax policies, (3) 
discretionary subsidy systems, (4) discretionary giving of credit, and (5) discretionary external 
investment. Discretion in determining prices in (1) refers to a situation where monopolistic or 
oligopolistic firms can set prices. In this case, the budget softens in the sense that firms can 
easily pass increased input costs onto output prices. Even when output prices are regulated by 
the authorities, firms can pass their costs on by exercising their political influence over the 
decisions made by the authorities. The discretionary tax policies and subsidy systems in (2) and 
(3) refer to situations where firms can influence tax or subsidy policies through the political 
activities of a certain industry. Discretionary giving of credit in (4) and discretionary external 
investment and financing in (5) represent similar concepts, and refer to situations where 
government-affiliated companies may postpone a repayment at any time, or receive additional 
loans. In sum, the existences of regulations, including policies for taxation and subsidies that 
are characteristic of a centralized economy, as well as the existence of discretion over capital 
distribution, are factors that soften corporate budget constraints.   
      Under soft budget constraints, even a firm that should otherwise disappear from the market 
(i.e., a company that is constantly losing money and has no recognized corporate value) 
continues to operate without going bankrupt. Nor does such a firm examine efficient input and 
output combinations in accordance with changes in factor/output prices; it can ignore price 
signals. This means that the risk of corporate management failure can be passed on to the 
government through changes in regulations and subsidies. For these reasons, Kornai (1983) 
concluded that in a centralized (socialist) economy, demand for inputs is limitless and, as a 
result, resource shortages become a normal state.
2  
   Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Segal (1998), Li (1998), Shleifer and Vishney (1994), and 
others have shed light on the studies by Kornai (1979 and 1983) and approached the soft budget 
problem theoretically. 
   According to Maskin (1996 and 1999), the soft budget problem can be classified into three 
categories: (1) concentration of lenders, (2) concentration of production organizations (i.e., the 
                                                                            
2    Kornai’s (1978 and 1983) arguments about soft and hard budget constraints and their consequences are 
also summarized by Itoh and Osano (2003). 144  K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 
emergence of an oligopoly), and (3) distribution of controlling rights over a firm to the 
government. He argued that budget constraints soften in each of these cases. 
     First, let us look at (1) the concentration of lenders. Based on the idea of Dewatripont and 
Maskin (1995), Maskin created a model in which there is a centralized financial institution (i.e., 
a single lender), and additional loans tend to be extended even to firms that should otherwise be 
liquidated, or when a project should otherwise be cancelled. 
   Let us assume that there are two types of investment projects: fast and slow. The former 
requires one unit of funding at the beginning of the first period, and will produce a profit of Rf 
(>1) at the end of the first period. The latter requires one unit of funding at the beginning of the 
first period as well as at the end of the first period, and will produce a profit of 
s R
~   at the end of 
the second period.   That is, 
s R
~  is a random variable and also depends on the degree of 
monitoring efforts by the bank, which is measured by p. 
s R
~  equals  R (2>R>0) with probability p, 
and 0 with the probability 1-p. 
   Let us also assume that a firm (entrepreneur) does not have its own capital and has to 
borrow from a bank the entire amount necessary to implement a project. The firm 
(entrepreneur) will get a private profit of Ec (>0) if the project is completed. Conversely, it 
suffers a private loss of Ei (<0) if the project is not implemented or cancelled at the end of the 
first period. The firm already knows whether the project is fast or slow, but a lender bank does 
not. So, there is an asymmetry of information between the two parties. It is assumed that at the 
beginning of the first period a loan is executed without the lender distinguishing whether the 
project is the fast or slow type. This information will be known, however, at the end of the first 
period.   Since there is only one lender bank and it has monopolistic bargaining power, all the 
proceeds from the project except for the firm’s (entrepreneur’s) private benefits will belong to 
the bank. 
   Let us assume that the loan was executed and the firm implemented a fast project. In this 
case, the net profits of the bank and the firm are expressed respectively as: 
   B a n k :    Rf-1>0 
   Firm  (Entrepreneur):   Ec > 0 
If the project is slow, the net profits of the bank and the firm depend on whether or not an 
additional loan is provided at the end of the first period, which is expressed as: 
   B a n k :  
      -1      if an additional loan is not provided for the second period 
       ) ) ( ' ( 2 ) (
* * * R p p R p = − − ψ ψ   if an additional loan is provided for the second period 
   Firm  (Entrepreneur): 
      E i  < 0      if an additional loan is not provided for the second period   
      E c  > 0      if an additional loan is provided for the second period 
It is assumed that  ) (p ψ  is the function for the cost of the bank to monitor the slow project.   
It is an increasing and convex function.    In other words,  ) ) ( ' ( 2 ) (
* * * R p p R p = − − ψ ψ  represents   K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 145 
the expected net profit from the slow project for the second period when the bank performs 
optimal monitoring activities. 
      Whether or not the bank will extend an additional loan to the slow project at the end of the 
first period depends on the magnitude of  2 ) (
* * − − p R p ψ  and  -1.  
   I f   2 ) (
* * − − p R p ψ   > -1, then the bank will agree to an additional loan. However, R < 2 means 
2 ) (
* * − − p R p ψ   < 0. This means that the slow project itself is not an efficient undertaking for the 
bank and for society as a whole, hence firms with slow projects present soft budget problems. 
   What lies behind the soft budget problem is that under a single lender, a loan during the 
first period turns into sunk costs, and the lender cannot refuse an additional loan in the second 
period. That is, it cannot commit to refuse additional lending. 
      In other words, if a lender can commit to refuse additional lending, the soft budget problem 
should be mitigated. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) argued that one method to achieve this 
commitment is to have a decentralized economy, which equates to an increased number of 
lenders (two lenders in this example). 
      Then, let us assume that the first bank provides an initial loan to a firm and the second bank 
will determine whether or not it will lend the firm additional funds at the end of the first period. 
The assumption is that each bank has only one unit of capital and that raising funds from a third 
bank is costly for both banks. In this case, whether or not the second bank will provide an 
additional loan depends on the magnitude of contracted interest that the second bank can 
obtain, and on the probability of the project’s success, which requires a monitoring by the 
second bank. The first bank, which provided the initial loan, also has a claim over R. Therefore, 
the net profit that the second bank makes from the additional loan is expected to be smaller 
than  1 *) ( * − − p R p ψ unless the contracted claim of the second bank has complete priority over 
that of the first bank. Furthermore, the degree of monitoring by the second bank will become 
smaller than  * p   when the second bank can obtain only a part of R. This effect also reduces the 
expected profit for the second bank from the additional loan. If the second bank’s expected 
profit from the additional loan becomes a negative value, the second bank would not agree to the 
additional loan. This means that having multiple (decentralized) lenders can mitigate the soft 
budget problem to a certain degree. In other words, having multiple lenders creates conflicts of 
interest among the lenders and makes additional financing difficult via the so-called 
debt-overhang mechanism. 
      Next, let us look at (2) the concentration of production organizations (i.e., the emergence of 
an oligopoly) and (3) the distribution of controlling rights over a firm to the government. 
   As for (2), Segal (1998) has used a model involving a monopolistic firm in a regulated 
industry to explain that the concentration of production could cause soft budget constraints. 
According to Segal (1998), a government may want monopolistic companies such as public 
utilities to continue operating with support from government subsidies even when their losses 
are sufficient to force the firms out of business. However, if there is an information asymmetry 146  K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 
between the government and a monopolistic firm about the type of investment or the degree of 
efforts by the firm, the monopolistic firm is motivated to seek a subsidy rather than to improve 
productivity by investing. This aggravates the soft budget problem. Qian and Xu (1998) argued 
that R&D performance will be poor under a centralized (socialist) economy due to this kind of 
soft budget problem. 
   Incidentally, according to the arguments above, we can expect to improve productivity by 
lowering the degree of concentration or by raising the level of competition within the oligopoly 
or the industry, thereby decreasing the possibility of receiving a subsidy. In this sense, we can 
say that case (2) is similar to case (1), concentration of lenders. 
   In the meantime, case (3), the distribution of controlling rights over a firm to the 
government, is different from the first two cases in that a soft budget problem arises when 
controlling rights over a firm belong to the government, even partially. Li (1998), as well as 
Shleifer and Vishney (1994), discussed the soft budget problem from the viewpoint of a 
government’s (partial) holding of controlling rights over a firm. They argued that when the 
public sector holds even a part of the managerial control rights of a firm, a type of rent-seeking 
activity happens between the firm (entrepreneur) and the public sector, which will cause the 
soft budget problem. 
      For example, in case (1), let’s assume  2 ) (
* * − − p R p ψ   < -1 is valid. In this case, the additional 
loan would not be provided even if there is a concentration of lenders (single bank). However, if 
the lender shares the managerial control rights over the firm with the existing manager 
(entrepreneur), an incentive for the lender to provide the additional loan may be created, since 
the lender can share the private benefit from the continuation of the slow project.   
   Suppose  that  i c E p R p E > − − + 1 ) (
* * ψ   is satisfied. This creates the possibility that the lender 
and the firm may collude with each other or that the firm may have bribed the lender in return 
for Ec (Ei), which would make the additional loan profitable for the lender. 
 
II.2.    Do Public Finance Institutions Really Soften the Budget Constraints? 
 
      So far, I have examined cases in which serious soft budget problems arise with public sector 
involvement. Now, how much do these arguments hold true to the Japanese public financing 
system? In the following paragraphs, I will briefly examine this issue from the viewpoints of (1) 
concentration of lenders (centralization), (2) concentration of production (monopoly), and (3) 
the public sector’s holding of managerial rights. I will also examine the possibility that public 
financing by government-affiliated financial institutions, in particular, hardens budget 
constraints. 
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II.2.1.    The Soft Budget View 
 
   First, let us discuss (1) concentration of lenders (centralization). Japanese public financial 
institutions are huge organizations and have large amounts of money. The funds in postal 
savings and postal insurance accounts total 340 trillion yen, exceeding the combined total of 
funds held by large private banks. The percentage of postal savings in household financial assets 
was about 17% in 2002. The share of government-affiliated financial institutions in the lending 
m a r k e t  w a s  a b o u t  2 8 %  i n  2 0 0 1 .  I f  w e  l o o k  a t  t h e  p u b l i c  f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m  a s  o n e  f i n a n c i a l  
institution, we can consider it as a huge centralized financial institution, as in Dewatripont and 
Maskin’s argument (1995). Of course, in reality, public financial institutions are not a single 
centralized organization, where postal savings as entry institutions and the 
government-affiliated financial institutions as exit institutions are divided. However, each 
institution is partly becoming independent; for example, the postal savings is allowed to invest 
on its own, while some government-affiliated financial institutions finance independently, 
issuing  Zaito Kikansai (bonds without government guarantee). Furthermore, as for the 
government-affiliated financial institutions, consolidations are under way. For example, the 
Japan Development Bank was consolidated with the Hokkaido-Tohoku Development Finance 
Public Corporation in 1999, forming the current Development Bank of Japan, and the 
Export-Import Bank of Japan was consolidated with The Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, 
forming the Japan Bank for International Cooperation.
3  According to Dewatripont and Maskin, 
this trend toward the consolidation of government-affiliated financial institutions may increase 
exposure of the soft budget problem
4 . Indeed, it is said that the bad loans held by 
government-affiliated financial institutions amounted to about 4.2 trillion yen as of the end of 
March 2001, and about 6.4 trillion yen has already been provided by the government to make up 
for the losses at these institutions over the past ten years.   
      Next, the argument about (2) concentration of production or subsidies to monopolistic firms 
m a y  be  a p pl i c a b l e  to  so -called special companies, such as NTT, Japan Tobacco (JT), Tokyo 
Metro Co., and Narita International Airport Corp.    Furthermore, the argument about the public 
sector’s holdings of management rights may be applied to the Japan Highway Public Corp. and 
various independent administrative entities. The media have been strongly criticizing these 
companies for continuing inefficient projects. A type of rent-seeking activity between the 
private sector (interest groups) and the public sector (politicians) may be inviting the softening 
of budget constraints. 
 
                                                                            
3    According to some media reports, there is a plan under discussion to consolidate eight 
government-affiliated financial institutions into two organizations. 
4    There is also a possibility that the consolidation of the Japan Development Bank and the 
Hokkaido-Tohoku Development Finance Public Corporation, both of which suffered from bad loans, had 
advanced the concentration and softened the budget constraint. 148  K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 
II.2.2.    The Hard Budget View 
 
   D o   a l l   g o v e r n m e n t -affiliated financial institutions soften budget constraints? Some facts may 
suggest that government-affiliated financial institutions do in fact harden budgets. 
   For example, let us look at the forgiveness of debts by government-affiliated financial 
institutions. According to newspapers, government-affiliated financial institutions were not 
allowed to waive debts through other than legal procedures until March 2003, when the 
Development Bank of Japan waived debt outside the courts for the first time (the Hakodate 
Dock case).   
   Furthermore, as the Japanese Bankers Association reports, government-affiliated financial 
institutions often have liens of first priority. This means that government-affiliated financial 
institutions have an interest as senior (secured) creditors. It would seem that 
government-affiliated financial institutions have little incentive to help reorganize a borrower 
because, in general, secured creditors prefer liquidation rather than the continuation of business. 
In fact, some newspapers say there are cases where a borrower was forced to liquidate because a 
government-affiliated financial institution did not cooperate with a reorganization plan even 
though other, private financial institutions had agreed to it. If this is true, we may be able to say 
that the existence of government-affiliated financial institutions hardens budget constraints. 
   Table 1 shows changes in borrowing from banks and the amount of debt forgiveness in the 
Daiei Co. case based on a reorganization plan under the initiative of the Industrial 
Revitalization Corporation of Japan in 2005. When we look at the changes in borrowings from 
banks, we can see that the lending shares and balances of the three major private banks (UFJ, 
Sumitomo Mitsui, and Mizuho) had increased annually, and that the so-called mein yose (the 
concentration of debts with main banks) was happening rapidly. In the meantime, the lending 
shares and balances of the Development Bank of Japan, a government-affiliated financial 
institution, were much the same as those of the three main banks in the beginning of 2000, but 
they have decreased every year since then. When we look at the amount of debt forgiveness, the 
waived debt percentages against the lending balances of the three main banks as of 2004 were 
40% to 50%, while that of the Development Bank of Japan was only about 14%. Some 
newspapers reported that the percentage of debt waiver for all unsecured claims was 81.1% on 
average. This means that the Development Bank of Japan has a high percentage of secured 
claims. 
   In fact, according to Daiei’s annual report, collateral/security was provided for long-term 
borrowings from the Development Bank of Japan, while no collateral/security was provided for 
long-term borrowings from private banks. In addition, although the repayment dates for the 
private banks tended to be earlier than those for the Development Bank of Japan, the borrowings 
from private banks tended to be refinanced, and the terms of their loans were in fact made 
longer. In contrast, the borrowings from the Development Bank of Japan were certainly repaid   K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 149 
Table 1: Trend of Balance of Loans of Daiei from Financial Institutions 
100 Millions of yen 
 





UFJ  672 (17.5) 2676 (36.1)  3504 (40.6) 3540 (43.2) 4206 (43.6)  2043  (48.6) 
Mitsui Sumitomo  394 (10.3) 1338 (18.1)  1768 (20.5) 1573 (19.2) 1906 (19.7)  853  (44.7) 
Mizuho  506 (13.2) 1338 (18.1)  1857 (21.5) 1768 (21.6) 2101 (21.7)  836  (39.8) 
Tokyo Mitsubishi  146 (3.8) N/A  N/A 100 (1.2) 100 (1.0)  57  (57) 
Development Bank  315 (8.3) 250 (3.4)  178 (2.1) 160 (1.9) 99 (1.0)  14  (14.1) 
Norinchukin  282 (7.4) 253 (3.4)  253 (2.9) 353 (4.3) 474 (4.9)  227  (47.8) 
Others  1506 (39.4) N/A  N/A 684 (8.4) 764 (7.9)  20  (0) 
Total  3821 (100) 7404 (100)  8627 (100) 8178 (100) 9650 (100)  4050  (100) 
Note : Numbers in parentheses for each year represent percentages against total loan balance. 
Debt waiver ratios are the percentages of requested debt waiver amount of January 2005 against the 
borrowing balance for 2004. 
Source : Annual Report, Daiei Co. 
 
upon maturation. In other words, in terms not only of liens but also of due dates, the claims of 
the private banks were actually subordinated. 
   Of course, one can attribute this preferential treatment of the government-affiliated 
financial institution to the substantial lender responsibilities of main banks. However, the 
burden of government-affiliated financial institutions seems to be lighter than those of other 
lenders, even when a private bank is not the primary lender (e.g., a government-affiliated 
financial institution is the largest lender).   
   Table 2 shows the burden ratio (percentage of debt waived) of private banks and 
government-affiliated financial institutions with respect to the debt restructuring of failed 
third-sector organizations whose largest lender was the Development Bank of Japan. 
      In the case of Mutsu-Ogawara, Asia and Pacific Trade Center (ATC), and Crysta Nagahori, 
the percentages of debt waivers by the government-affiliated financial institution were equal to 
or lower than those of the private financial institutions.  In the case of Crysta Nagahori, the 
loans from the Development Bank of Japan were completely repaid. Although the Development 
Bank of Japan ended up agreeing to waive debt in the Ishikari Development case, it had initially 
refused to do so, forcing Ishikari Development to go bankrupt under the Minji-Saisei ho (Civil 
Rehabilitation Law). 
      Incidentally, there are studies about the role of the Development Bank of Japan, specifically 
t h e  “ c o w b e l l  e f f e c t ”  d i s c u s s e d  b y  H i g a n o  ( 1 9 8 6 )  a s  w e l l  a s  b y  H o r i u c h i  a n d  Z u i  ( 1 9 9 4 ) .  
According to the latter study, firms that borrowed from the Development Bank of Japan tended 
to significantly increase their borrowings from private financial institutions after receiving  150  K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 
Table 2: Outline of Third Sector Debt Restructuring 
Name of Third Sector 
Organization 




¥185.2 billion  •  Establishment of liquidation company 
•  Debt waiver percentage of Development Bank of 
Japan: about 69% 
•  Debt waiver percentage of private financial 
institutions: about 69% 
Ishikari Development
(Hokkaido, 2002) 
¥65 billion  •  Civil Rehabilitation Law 
•  35 billion debt waived by financial institutions 
•  Development Bank of Japan refused to waiver the 
debt before taking legal procedures 
Asia and Pacific Trade 
Center (ATC) 
(Osaka, 2004) 
¥128.5 billion  •  Special mediation 
•  Debt waiver percentage of private financial 
institutions: 65% 




¥32 billion  •  Special mediation 
•  Debt waiver percentage of private financial 
institutions: 40.7% 
•  Debt from Development Bank of Japan was repaid in 
full amount 
Source : Nihon Keizai Shinbun, etc. 
 
loans from the Development Bank of Japan. They concluded that the fact that a firm had 
borrowed from the Development Bank of Japan served as a kind of signal (a cowbell), which 
mitigated the asymmetry of information between the borrowers and private financial 
institutions. To put it still another way, the cowbell argument implied that the Development 
Bank of Japan was more capable of producing information than private financial institutions 
were. If this is true, the Development Bank of Japan not only softens the budget constraint but 
also hardens it, because private financial institutions never follow the Development Bank of 
Japan unless it has superior information about distressed firms. 
   In the following sections, to examine whether government-affiliated financial institutions 
are hardening or softening the budget constraint, the role and effect of government-affiliated 
financial institutions on DIP financing and the selection of bankruptcy procedures will be 
considered. 
 
III.    DIP Financing and Corporate Debt Restructuring in Japan 
 
III.1.    DIP Financing and Corporate Debt Restructuring 
 
      DIP financing refers to loans to distressed firms whose existing manager remains on the job 
(debtor-in-possession, DIP) under legal bankruptcy procedures such as Chapter 11 of the   K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 151 
United States Bankruptcy Code. In many cases, the cash flow of the bankrupt company rapidly 
deteriorates. The purpose of DIP financing is to mitigate the deterioration of the firm’s value in 
such a situation. 
   DIP financing serves not only to prevent the deterioration of a firm’s assets by securing 
immediate running capital, but also to make it easier to carry out an investment project that 
would increase the value of the firm. However, DIP financing carries with it the risk of 
overinvestment and enables the funding of projects that should not be funded. Furthermore, 
since the existing manager will remain on the job under DIP in general, DIP financing may 
increase the risk of a moral hazard problem ex-ante. 
   In the following paragraphs, I will provide an overview of Chapter 11 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code, and review some previous studies on DIP financing. 
 
III.2.    United States Bankruptcy Laws and Studies on DIP Financing 
 
III.2.1.    United States Bankruptcy Laws 
 
   The U.S. Federal Bankruptcy Reform Act was drastically revised in 1978 and enacted in 
October of the following year. It provides two types of procedures: liquidation procedures in 
Chapter 7 and reorganization procedures in Chapter 11. 
      In Chapter 7 liquidation procedures, a court-appointed trustee sells or disposes of the assets 
of the firm, and the proceeds are distributed automatically in accordance with the Absolute 
Priority Rule (APR). This rule (hereinafter referred to as “APR”) prioritizes claims against a firm. 
The proceeds are distributed in the order of secured claims, preferential claims (e.g., trustee fees, 
labor claims, tax claims, etc.), unsecured claims, shareholders’ claims, etc. Creditors of a junior 
class receive repayment or distribution of assets only after the creditors of a senior class are 
repaid in full. 
   On the other hand, Chapter 11 provides procedures intended for the reorganization and 
restructuring of firms and a trustee is rarely appointed. Instead, a reorganization plan is 
developed by the existing manager (debtors-in-possession), and after negotiations with 
creditors’ committees of the various classes 
5, a plan is submitted for a decision, which is 
obtained by a majority vote among the creditors from all classes; that is, a majority of creditors 
who collectively hold two-thirds of the voting rights. Alternatively, if a shareholders’ committee 
is organized, the plan has to be supported by two-thirds of the voting rights. In either case, the 
plan must then be approved by the court; that is, the court must determine whether or not the 
plan is feasible and serves the best interests of the vested parties. What is meant by “best 
                                                                            
5    A creditor committee is usually comprised of seven large unsecured creditors appointed by the court.   
However, depending upon the details of the claim types, the committee may be divided into multiple 
committees of various classes, or a shareholders committee may be formed. 152  K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 
interests” is that the benefits from the reorganization for individual creditors are equal to or 
greater than the benefits from liquidation. Once the reorganization plan is approved, the 
borrower is exempted from all the obligations generated before the adoption of the 
reorganization plan, and is obliged to make repayment in accordance with the reorganization 
plan. 
      If a certain class of creditors opposes the reorganization plan, but the court determines that 
the plan is fair and equitable, the court will approve the plan anyway. The concept of “fair and 
equitable” concerns the class of opposing creditors and means that what the opposing creditors 
would receive under the reorganization plan will be equal to or greater than what they would 
receive in the case of liquidation. If there is opposition from creditors of any classes, the 
management needs to give a sufficient explanation about the plan to the court. This procedure is 
generally called a “cram down” hearing and is considered a factor in delaying approval. If the 
reorganization plan is disapproved by all the creditors or if the court determines that the plan is 
not fair and equitable, a revision of the reorganization plan is ordered, and in many cases the 
case is transferred to Chapter 7 procedures. 
      The characteristics of Chapter 11 can be summarized in the following four points. 
 1 )   D e b t o r -in-possession (DIP). Unlike Chapter 7, Chapter 11 enables the existing manager to 
engage in the management of the company as DIP. Of course, prior notice to and approval 
from the court are needed for the sale or lease of important assets or for borrowings after 
the bankruptcy; such transactions are known as the “extraordinary course of business.” It 
is difficult, however, to clearly distinguish the “ordinary course of business,” which rests 
within the discretion of DIP, from the extraordinary course. Therefore, the DIP has a 
bargaining power as a result. 
  2)    DIP’s exclusive right to submit the reorganization plan. Once bankruptcy is filed, DIP has 
120 days in which to exercise this right. Furthermore, once the DIP submits the 
reorganization plan during this period, it may request a 60-day extension. It is also 
allowed to a certain degree to classify unsecured creditors in such a way that the 
reorganization plan is passed easily. For example, it can combine a minority of opposing 
creditors with a majority of supporting creditors. This means that the submission timing or 
the speed of progress of the reorganization plan and its content is, to a significant degree, 
up to the discretion of DIP.   
  3)    Preferential treatment for new loans (so-called DIP financing) after the bankruptcy. Loans 
extended after the bankruptcy are given preferential treatment for repayment. The 
establishment of a lien that is equal or preferential to existing liens (called a “priming 
lien”) is also allowed. 
  4)    The principle of majority decision enables certain creditors and the DIP to legally control 
and dismiss the opinions and rights of minority creditors. However, this is applicable only 
to unsecured creditors; secured creditors are not subject to these procedures.   K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 153 
III.2.2.    Views on DIP Financing 
 
   Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) pointed out that the characteristics of Chapter 11 described 
above, including automatic stay (suspension of payment), the rights of the DIP, and the 
principle of majority decision, could create an environment that is advantageous to subordinated 
creditors, such as shareholders or DIP, and that consequently causes an overinvestment socially 
For example, while automatic stay freezes repayment obligations, the fact that the DIP has 
exclusive rights to submit the reorganization plan and classify creditors facilitates a 
reorganization that serves its self-interests. In particular, when the cost of prolonged 
negotiations is high (e.g., the discount rate is high), the DIP will have significant bargaining 
power, and a large amount of rent may go to the subordinated creditors or shareholders as well 
as to DIP. 
   Hotchkiss (1995) studied the performance of 197 companies after their procedures under 
Chapter 11 were approved and completed. He found that about 40% of the companies continued 
to lose money for three years after the completion of the procedures, and 32% of the companies 
in the study (i.e., 32% of the 197) had either filed for Chapter 11 again or gone to private 
procedures. Based on this observation, he concluded that Chapter 11 is biased towards excessive 
reorganization. 
      In the meantime, Eberhart, Altman, and Aggarwal (1999) conducted an event study of stock 
price reactions for 131 companies that had completed reorganization plans approved under 
Chapter 11. They found that news of the completion of the reorganization plans generated 
abnormally positive increases in stock prices. Although this result does not directly negate 
Hotchkiss’s analysis, it presents an opposing view on companies that have completed Chapter 11 
procedures. 
   Lastly, Dahiya, John, Puri, and Ramirez (2003) gave an overview of DIP financing and 
conducted an empirical analysis of its economic impact. According to their studies, about 30% of 
the companies that filed for Chapter 11 from 1988 to 1997 received DIP financing. There was a 
particularly high number of DIP financing cases among retailers with relatively high percentages 
of liquid assets. They also analyzed the relationship between the length of time from the filing of 
Chapter 11 to the completion of the reorganization plan (or liquidation when a case was moved 
to Chapter 7) and DIP financing, and found that companies that received DIP financing 
completed their reorganization or liquidation sooner. This can be interpreted to mean that DIP 
financing mitigates the problem of underinvestment and accelerates decision-making toward 
both reorganization and liquidation. In this respect, if we accept the results of the empirical 
study by Eberhart, Altman, and Aggarwal (1999), we can say that early completion of the 
reorganization plan increases stock values.    In that sense, DIP financing may increase corporate 
values. Meanwhile, early liquidation is also generally considered to contribute to the 
maintenance of a firm’s value, and therefore DIP financing can be considered to have a positive 154  K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 
effect in this respect as well. Dahiya, John, Puri, and Ramirez (2003) found that existing 
creditors (banks) tend to extend DIP financing for relatively small companies; or, in cases of 
pre-packaged Chapter 11s, external creditors tend to extend DIP financing to large companies. 
They interpret this to mean that the problem of asymmetry of information is significant for small 
companies, and therefore the monitoring capability of existing creditors (banks) is important. 
 
III.3.    Outline of DIP Financing in Japan 
 
      Our first example of DIP financing in Japan is the case of Footwork Express Co., which filed 
for procedures under Minji Saisei ho (Civil Rehabilitation Law) in May 2001. Shortly thereafter, 
Footwork Express Co. obtained credit line from the Development Bank of Japan in the amount of 
2 billion yen. More recently, DIP financing has attracted attention as a way to enhance the 
functions of relationship banking. According to a report by the Financial Service Agency 
(“Progress Status of Action Program to Enhance Relationship Banking Functions”), there were 
216 cases totaling 60.3 billion yen in 2003 and 330 cases totaling 70.8 billion yen in 2004. 
      Table 3 summarizes the implementation status of DIP financing in Japan. These data are from 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun and a website of the Development Bank of Japan. Although news about 
DIP financing is not scarce, specific information and details are not clear. Therefore, cases 
covered by Table 3 are limited to those for which a certain degree of information was available 
regarding whether the lender in DIP financing was an existing bank (existing/main bank) or not 
(new/non-main bank) and whether or not the DIP financing was accelerating the reorganization 
(or liquidation) of a firm. 
      When we look at lender banks, we notice that the Development Bank of Japan was the lender 
for DIP financing in more than half of the cases. It was involved, in particular, as lender in all 
cases until the beginning of 2003. Furthermore, in many cases the Development Bank of Japan 
extended loans as new/non-main bank for borrowers. In many cases, private banks were 
involved in DIP financing when they had already been lenders, and, if not, they collaborated 
with the Development Bank of Japan. Although in about 30% of the cases a new/non-main bank 
was involved in DIP financing alone, this activity was involved with one bank in particular: 
Tokyo Star Bank. 
      In many cases, the purpose of the DIP financing was to reorganize the business. In fact, quite 
a number of cases of DIP financing had as their purpose the early completion of reorganization 
or a lump-sum repayment of secured claims. There seem to be few cases of liquidation after DIP 
financing. This may have something to do with the fact that Japan does not have a long history 
of DIP financing and thus only a few years have passed since firms have begun receiving it. 
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Note : DBJ: Development Bank of Japan 
DKB: Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank 
Source : Nihon Keizai Shinbun etc. 
 
      The Development Bank of Japan was involved in many cases as the lender at the start of DIP 
financing. We can interpret this to mean that there was a kind of cowbell effect in the field of 
DIP financing. In fact, there were quite a few cases in which reorganization was put on the right 
track under a new sponsor or a reorganization plan was completed early. We can say that the 
Development Bank of Japan was providing information production and risk bearing functions 
that private banks could not provide and was facilitating efficient debt restructuring as a result. 
   In the meantime, DIP financing in Japan is positioned as Kyoeki Saiken (common claims). 
Although claims on DIP financing are given repayment priority over general (unsecured) claims 
generated before the bankruptcy, they are subordinate to secured claims, tax claims, and labor 
claims. Therefore, it is difficult to differentiate or give preference to them over other common 
claims. In comparison to DIP financing in the U.S., claims on DIP financing in Japan are not 
necessarily given high repayment priority. It may be that the Development Bank of Japan had 
extended loans despite relatively high risks, thus causing overinvestment.   K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 157 
IV.  Corporate Debt Restructuring and Government-Affiliated Financial 
Institutions 
 
      In this section, I will focus on firms that actually failed and examine empirically what kind 
of impact the existence of government-affiliated financial institutions has had on debt 
restructuring. 
 
IV.1.    Issues Concerning Corporate Debt Restructuring 
 
   Corporate debt restructuring can be largely categorized in one of two ways: as “legal 
procedures,” in which reorganization or liquidation takes place in accordance with legal 
procedures, including corporate reorganization, civil rehabilitation, and corporate 
consolidation; or as “private procedures,” in which reorganization or liquidation takes place 
outside of the legal procedures under certain guidelines or at the initiative of, say, the Industrial 
Revitalization Corporation of Japan. 
   Regardless of whether the procedures are legal or private, it is desirable from an economic 
standpoint to restructure a firm in such a way that its value is maximized. It is not necessarily 
clear, however, that actual debt restructuring is in line with the maximization of a firm’s value. 
     For example, let’s say a firm is restructured under legal procedures. Interests among senior 
and junior creditors may vary depending upon whether the firm continues after reorganization 
or is liquidated. In this case, even if a greater firm value would be created by the continuance or 
reorganization of the firm than by its liquidation, and if senior or secured creditors insist on 
liquidation and the liquidation is approved by a majority vote, the company would be liquidated, 
generating over-liquidation. On the other hand, even if a greater firm value would be created by 
liquidation than by continuing the business, and if the junior or unsecured creditors insist on 
reorganization and the reorganization is approved by a majority vote, a firm that should 
otherwise be liquidated may continue and be reorganized, generating under-liquidation. 
   A similar problem could happen in private procedures as well. Let’s assume that a greater 
firm value is generated if debts are privately waived and reorganized than in a case where debts 
are restructured under the legal procedures. For example, this may be true when legal 
procedures decrease the trust in and reputation of the firm and cause valuable employees and 
business partners to leave. Even in this case, individual creditors have an incentive not to waive 
their own debts and instead to try to achieve a private reorganization at the expense of other 
creditors. 
     This is known as the free rider problem. If many creditors think in the same way, it would 
result in costly legal procedures. On the other hand, if creditors try to collect their claims at the 
same time through inefficient piecemeal liquidation, the firm may be forced into de facto 
bankruptcy (legal procedures). In either case, over-bankruptcy (excessive use of legal 158  K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 
procedures) happens in a sense that a company that should otherwise be privately reorganized 
becomes bankrupt 
6. 
   By contrast, there is a possibility that a firm may avoid bankruptcy through private 
procedures, even when legal procedures are more desirable (i.e., under-bankruptcy). In fact, we 
cannot deny the possibility that junior creditors that do not want bankruptcy might agree to 
additional loans or debt waivers to mitigate the cash flow of the firm and delay legal procedures 
(oigaashi). 
   If corporate debt restructuring is not necessarily implemented in an efficient way as 
described above 
7, the issues to be examined here are the extent of its inefficiency and its 
orientation: over/under-liquidation and over/under-bankruptcy. Therefore, in the following 
sections, an estimation model is used to evaluate these issues applying a qualitative response 
model. 
 
IV.2.    Debt Restructuring Efficiency Estimation Model 
 
   Let us assume that the corporate value of a firm (firm i) when legal reorganization, legal 
liquidation, or private reorganization takes place is expressed as 
C
i V ,  L
i V or  B
i V , respectively. 


















   P l e a s e   n o t e   t h a t  
i X is a variable (vector) expressing the financial characteristics of the firm, 
(, , )
j jC L B β =   is a parameter common to firms, and  (, , )
j
i ujC L B = is a random disturbance. 
      Let’s assume that the corporate value is composed of fixed assets that generate cash flow or 
operating income, plus current assets that do not generate cash flow. The cash flow is generated 
only when the firm continues its business, and it is difficult to sell or convert the fixed assets to 
other firms. From this assumption, we can infer that in the case of legal or private 
reorganization, the corporate value depends largely on operating income, while in the case of 
                                                                            
6    In this paper the term “bankruptcy” is used for companies that undergo legal bankruptcy procedures. In 
practice, when the treatment of assets is consigned completely to creditors without taking legal 
procedures, it is also treated as “bankruptcy” in many cases.   
7  Decision-making = selection (reorganization or liquidation) of corporate debt restructuring generally 
affects the interests of and distribution to individual claim holders simultaneously, and therefore a 
decision that is optimal to society is not always made.    In other words, if there is a mechanism that 
coordinates interests among creditors in such a way that maximizes corporate value, an efficient debt 
restructuring becomes possible. In fact, it is known that when information regarding corporate value is 
shared among concerned parties, there is a mechanism that solves the problems of optimum debt 
restructuring and distribution at the same time.(Bebchuk (1988), Aghion, Hart, and Moore (1992), and 
Ikeo and Seshimo (1998)). 
8    If a corporate value is defined as the sum of current assets and fixed assets, which is the sum of cash 
flow in present value, the linear corporate value model described in this paper would be an acceptable 
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liquidation, it depends largely on current assets. The corporate value after debt restructuring is 
also considered to be influenced by an external disturbance term such as market demand. 
      In a qualitative response model, it is usually assumed that the one with the maximum utility 
(in this case, the corporate value) is selected among possible multiple choices. In this paper, 
however, it is assumed that an efficient debt restructuring procedure is not necessarily selected 
and that the actual procedure is based on the following criteria. 
Restructuring through legal procedures:  CL
ii VV α ><  (1) 
Restructuring through private procedures: 
  MB





VVw h e n V V






   In other words, the interests among creditors concerning debt restructuring are not fully 
coordinated, and distortions represented by α and β (when  both α and β are not 1) are 
created 
9. 
     This means that, for example, in the case of legal procedures, not necessarily the greater of 
C
i V  or  L
i V   is chosen. Rather, if  α  is greater than 1, even if  C
i V   is greater than  L
i V , liquidation 
may be chosen (over-liquidation), whereas if α  is smaller than 1, there is a risk of 
under-liquidation or over-reorganization. Likewise, in the case of private procedures, the 
greater corporate value, be it under the legal procedures (defined as  M
i V ) or under the private 
procedures ( B
i V ), is not necessarily chosen. Rather, if β  is greater than 1, over-reorganization 
happens in a sense that a firm that should otherwise go bankrupt survives, and if  β is  smaller 
than 1, over-bankruptcy happens (See Figure 1). 
      The probability that a certain debt restructuring procedure is chosen can be formulated as a 
likelihood function by using actual corporate values for legal organization ( C
i V ), legal 
liquidation ( L
i V ), and private procedures/reorganization ( B
i V ). In the following paragraphs, a 
likelihood function is formulated separately for three different scenarios: 1) when the choice of 
debt restructuring procedures is limited to legal procedures (i.e., legal organization or 
liquidation) ((VC, VL) Model), 2) when the choice is made among legal liquidation, legal 
reorganization, or private reorganization ((VC, VL, VB) model), and 3) when the choice is made 
among legal liquidation, legal reorganization, or private reorganization, but the choice among 
legal procedures (legal reorganization or liquidation) is nested ((VM, VB) model). 
 
                                                                            
9    We can also say that inefficiency is represented by a constant term, such as  CL
ii VV α >< + . However, in 
general, the bigger a company is, the more creditors it has. Therefore, it would be appropriate to say that 




=160  K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 
Figure 1: Overliquidation and Underliquidation 
 
 
IV.2.1.    (VC, VL) Model 
 
   If the choice is limited to legal procedures (i.e., legal reorganization or legal liquidation), 
and it is made in accordance with formula (1), the probability that legal reorganization is 
selected and the corporate value becomes  C
i V   is expressed as follows: 
() /
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  (where f is a joint density function for  C
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The probability that legal liquidation is selected and the corporate value becomes  L
i V  is 
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When the probabilities of the former and the latter are expressed as  () Ci F X  and  () L i F X , 
respectively, and the number of samples is expressed as N, the likelihood (L) that a certain debt 
restructuring procedure is selected can be expressed as follows: 
   V
C, V
L     
   
   V
C  
   
    
αV
L(α>1) 




   
   
  
  
   










Area   K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 161 
) ( 0 ), ( 1
) ( ) (
1
1
private is procedure if y legal is procedure if z










− ∏  (5) 
 
IV.2.2.    (VC, VL, VB) Model 
 
   If the debt restructuring method is selected from the three options including private 
procedures in accordance with formulas (1) and (2), the probability that legal reorganization is 
selected and the corporate value becomes  C
i V   is expressed as follows: 
() / () /
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Likewise, the probability that legal liquidation is selected and the corporate value becomes  L
i V  
is expressed as follows: 
() /
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In the meantime, the probability that a private procedure is selected and the corporate value 
becomes 
B
i V  is  expressed  as  follows: 
() /
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In this case, the likelihood (L) that a certain procedure is selected can be expressed as follows 
10: 
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10    Although private procedures are chosen over legal procedures here, it is assumed that the realization of 
corporate value itself happens at the same time. If V
L and V
C are realized after V
B is realized, we need to 
modify the probability of certain debt restructuring choices to compare the expected corporate value 
after bankruptcy and V
B. 
) ( ), ( n liquidatio legal is procedure if y tion reorganiza legal is procedure if y i i 0 = 1 =
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IV.2.3.  (VM,  VB)  Model 
 
   The corporate value realized when legal procedures are taken, regardless of whether it is 
legal reorganization or liquidation, is expressed as follows: 
MM M
ii i VX u β =+  (12) 
If the choice between legal procedures or private procedures is made through β , the 
probability that legal procedures are selected and the corporate value becomes  M
i V is expressed 
as follows: 
() /
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The probability that the private procedures are selected and the corporate value becomes 
B
i V  is 
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If the probability of the former is expressed as  () Mi F X , and that of the latter is expressed as 
() Bi F X , the likelihood (L) that a certain procedure is selected can be expressed as follows: 
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IV.2.4.    The Impact of Government-Affiliated Financial Institutions 
 
   We can estimate the efficiency of the choice of debt restructuring procedures in the above 
model by using the maximum-likelihood method. 
Furthermore, it is possible to examine the impact of the existence of government-affiliated 
financial institutions by dividing sample cases into firms with borrowings from 
government-affiliated financial institutions and firms with no such borrowings. We can study 
whether there is any difference in the values of  α and β  between these groups of samples. 
   For example, let’s assume that α  is relatively larger (or smaller) in samples with 
borrowings from government-affiliated financial institutions than in samples with no such 
borrowings. In this case, the function of government-affiliated financial institutions can be   K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 163 
interpreted to raise (or lower) the probability of liquidation as the legal procedure and to 
harden (or soften) a firm’s budget constraints. However, we have to note that the extent of 
efficiency itself should be evaluated by how close  α is  to  1. 
   L i k e w i s e ,   i f   β  is relatively smaller (or larger) in samples with borrowings from 
government-affiliated financial institutions than in samples with no such borrowings, the 
function of government-affiliated financial institution can be interpreted to increase (or 
decrease) the probability of legal procedures over private procedures. Again we have to evaluate 
the efficiency by looking at the magnitude of discrepancy between  β and  1. 
 
IV.3.    Overview of the Sample Data 
 
      Before discussing the estimation results concerning  α and β, we will overview the sample 
data used in this section.   
     Table 4 shows list of failed firms used as primary samples. Total liabilities, listing section, 
category of business, and type of bankruptcy adopted are indicated. Also examined was whether 
or not there were borrowings from a government-affiliated institution. It seems that 
government-affiliated financial institutions tend to have made loans to larger firms belonging to 
the manufacturing and primary industries. 
      Table 5 summarizes the amounts of debt forgiveness with respect to firms whose debts were 
waived under private procedures, and whether or not there were borrowings from a 
government-affiliated institution. Details of private procedures are rarely disclosed, and in many 
cases only general information is reported. 
     Generally speaking, it will be desirable to use data as much as we can in order to estimate 
α and β  efficiently. Therefore, in this paper we have calculated the magnitude of the 
corporate values 
11 actually chosen in accordance with certain procedures. As for the concrete 
procedures for calculating corporate value, see the Appendix in this paper. 
   Table 6 shows the simple cross-section result on the relationship between the estimated 
corporate values and financial characteristics of the companies, including operating income, 
sales, cash and deposits, and the number of banks of account. In general, when a 
reorganization-type procedure is to be implemented, we can expect that corporate value would 
depend more on cash flow, which reflects operating income, sales, and other factors, since the 
business is continuing and the firm-specific activities will be important for the firm’s value. On 
the other hand, in the case of a liquidation-type procedure, corporate value can be expected to 
depend more on liquid assets. In fact, the results of Table 6 show the expected sign.   
 
                                                                            
11    Typical estimations using a qualitative response model can identify only the differences between 
coefficients for corporate properties. In this paper, however, in addition to  α and β, realized 
corporate values are also used as sample data, and therefore we can identify or estimate individual 
parameters. 164  K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 




















01/95 Nihon  Data 
Equipment 










02/95 Sorachi  Coal 
Mining 




05/95 Oriental  Shashin 
Kogyo 






08/95  Senko Sangyo  OTC  1260  sales of houses corporate 
consolidation 
 










09/96  Olympic Sports OTC  355  sales of sporting 
goods 
liquidation  




01/97 Coco  Yamaoka  Unlisted  481  sales  of  precious 
metals 
liquidation  
02/97 IGS  OTC  56  software 
development 
liquidation  
02/97 Suzuya  Unlisted  587  women’s  clothes composition   
03/97  Isuzu Kensetsu OSE 2  623  construction  special liquidation   
05/97 Kyoundo 
Pharmaceutical
Unlisted 445  wholesale  drugs 
and medicine 
liquidation  






























12/97 Nitto  Life  OTC  692  golf  clubs  composition   
12/97 Hakodate  Seiko 
Sengu 
Sapporo 138  manufacturing 
of fish nets 
































03/98 Nihon  Tochi 
Kairyo 




















08/98 Okura  Shoji  TSE  1  2528  all-purpose 
trading company 
liquidation  






09/98  Yahagi  TSE 1  35  imaging and 
software 
liquidation  
09/98 Urban  Home  Unlisted  350  sales  of 
buildings 
liquidation  
09/98 Nihon  Lease 
Auto 










10/98 Tescon  OTC  117  testers  liquidation   















03/99 Komuson  OSE  2  115  pachinko 
parlors 
liquidation  
03/99 Asahi  Toshi 
Kaihatsu 














04/99 Nikko  Electric 
Industry 







05/99 Aikoh  OTC  77  manufacturing 
of chemical 
products 




















07/99 Kokoku  Steel 
Wire 














10/99 Picoi  OTC  98  housing 
improvement 
composition  














04/00  Toyo Rope Mfg. TSE 2  59  manufacturing 















06/00 Nihon  Building 
Project 




















































01/01 Fujiseiko  Unlisted  370  machinery  and 
appliances 
liquidation  




02/01  Fuji Car MFG  TSE 1  210  bridges  corporate 
reorganization 
(minji-saisei) 





















































































07/02 Dai  Nihon 
Constrution 














Note : Corporation with loans from government-affiliated financial institutions (Development Bank of 
Japan, Japan Bank for International Cooperation, and the Shoko Chukin Bank) 
TSE 1: 1st Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
TSE 2: 2nd Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
OSE 1: 1st Section of the Osaka Stock Exchange 
OSE 2: 2nd Section of the Osaka Stock Exchange 
NSE: Nagoya Stock Exchange 
Source : Teikoku Databank, Kigyo Keiretsu Soran (Toyo Keizai Inc.), etc. 
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Table 5: Cases of Debt Waiver of Listed Companies (Private Procedures) 
Month/Year  Company Name  Amount of Debt 
Waived 
(100 million yen) 
Existence of 




01/99 Urban  Life  230  
02/99 Towa  Fudosan  2900  
02/99  Shokusan Jutaku Sogo  656   
02/99 Pasco  360  
03/99 Aoki  Construction  2049 yes 
04/99 Sato  Kyogyo  1109  
04/99 Chuo  Paperboard  114  
05/99 HASEKO  Corporation  3546  
05/99 Kanematsu  1550  
02/00 TOMEN  2000 yes 
03/00 Inoue  Kyogyo  143  
06/00 Hazama  1050  
12/00 Kumagai  Gumi  4300  
12/00 Mitsui  Construction  1420  
11/01 Ichida  83  
02/02 Daiei  1700 yes 
02/02 Iwataya  280 yes 
03/02 Misawa  Homes  350 yes 
03/02 Toyo  Shutter  125 yes 
05/02 Daikyo  4100  
01/03 Hazama  Corporation  1390  
03/04 Naito  188  
07/04 Kanebo  995  
Note : Corporation with loans from government-affiliated financial institutions (Development Bank of 
Japan, Japan Bank for International Cooperation, and the Shoko Chukin Bank) 
Source : Teikoku Databank 
 
Table 6: Estimated Corporate Value and Financial Indicators (OLS Estimation) 

















Operating Income  0.57 
(0.09) 
  -6.41 
(-0.67)
  17.53* 
(1.99) 
 
Sales    -0.01 
(-0.55)
  -0.01 
(-0.03)
  0.23** 
(8.99) 


























Adj R2  0.81  0.84  0.11  0.11  0.54  0.90 
JB  3.8  4.6  12.5  12.8  0.78  0.69 
Note : Numbers for operating income and sales are taken from the most recent financial reports 
JB:Jargque-Bera Residual Normality Test Statistic 
Numbers for number of accounts of banks are the numbers listed under “torihiki ginko su (number of 
accounts of banks)” in Kaisha Shikiho   K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 169 
IV.4.    Results of Estimation and Interpretation 
 
   Table 7 summarizes the results of α and β. In the table, ρ represents the correlation 
coefficients of the disturbance terms between legal liquidation and legal reorganization, which 
are given exogenously to reduce the number of parameters estimated 
12 ( ρ = 0, 0.5, -0.5). 
      First, in almost all samples, the estimated results were  α < 1,  β < 1, and the null hypothesis 
of  α = 1,  β = 1 was rejected 
1314. This means that there are overall tendencies for under- 
liquidation and over-bankruptcy in debt restructuring in Japan
15.  
   Next, let’s look at α and β where there are borrowings from government-affiliated 
financial institutions and where there are not. Although there is a tendency for the value of  α 
to be smaller (closer to 0) in the sub-sample where there are borrowings from 
government-affiliated financial institutions in comparison to the case where there are not, 
almost no difference is observed between these types of cases. In the meantime, we can say that 
the value of β is larger when there are borrowings from government-affiliated financial 
institutions. 
   This can be interpreted to mean that, when the choice is limited to legal procedures, the 
existence of government-affiliated financial institutions does not impact the choice of debt 
restructuring procedures between legal reorganization and liquidation. At the same time, the 
existence of such institutions functions to facilitate private procedures or to block legal 
procedures, when the choice is between private or legal procedures. As for the value of β, 
although the null hypothesis of β  = 1 is not rejected in many cases, in some models β  > 1 is 
observed. This seems to suggest that when there are borrowings from government-affiliated 
financial institutions, the choice between private or legal procedures sometimes becomes 
efficient. On the other hand, sometimes private procedures are taken even for firms that should 
otherwise take legal procedures. 
                                                                            
12    There are two debt restructuring method choices, forming a nested structure: first, there is a choice 
between legal or private procedures, and then, when legal procedures are selected, there is a choice 
between liquidation or reorganization. Therefore, there is a possibility that a positive correlation is 
generated between legal liquidation and reorganization. We can consider that a common shock (the cost 
of bankruptcy) is generated. If there is a shock that increases the corporate value under legal 
reorganization (i.e., the improvement of reorganization laws), as well as a shock that decreases corporate 
value under the liquidation (i.e., a sluggish real estate market), the correlation may become negative.   
13  W h e n   ρ  < 0, the estimate of α tends to become large. The reason why legal reorganizations are 
selected in many cases is not because debt restructuring is inefficient (low α), but because corporate 
value is thought to increase under reorganization rather than under liquidation. 
14    As for the causal relationship between  α and  β, we can usually think of the impact of legal 
procedures (α) on private procedures (β). However, the relationship here may be the impact of the 
possibility of over-bankruptcy (β < 1) on over-reorganization under legal procedures (α < 1).   
15    We need to note that even when α and  β  are significantly different from 1, it does not necessarily 







































Table 7: Estimation of α and β 
Amounts in parentheses are t values against null hypothesis = 1 
     α       β    
  (VC, VL)  Model  (VC, VL,VB)  Model  (VM, VB)  model  (VC, VL,VB)  Model 
  ρ=0  ρ=0.5  ρ=-0.5 ρ=0  ρ=0.5  ρ=-0.5 ρ=0  ρ=0.5  ρ=-0.5 ρ=0  ρ=0.5  ρ=-0.5
















































































(Note) Normal distribution model maximum likelihood method BHHH)。 
For initial values, OLS estimation was used (except that initial values for α and β are 1) 
For ρ in (VC, VL, VB) models, only the correlation between VC and VL are shown (assumption: VB is independent) 
Number of samples:    Total samples: 77   
  Samples of companies with loans from government-affiliated financial institutions: 19 
  Samples of companies with no loans from government-affiliated financial institutions: 58   K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 171 
      Why do firms tend to select private procedures when there are borrowings from 
government-affiliated financial institutions? Government-affiliated financial institutions were 
not allowed to waive their debts until 2003, and cases of debt waiver by such institutions are 
not included in the samples for analysis. The fact that government-affiliated financial 
institutions did not agree to debt waivers seems to have simply made private procedures more 
difficult, but in fact the opposite result was observed. There may have been a mechanism in 
which the unwillingness of such institutions to agree to debt waivers raised incentives for 
private financial institutions to seek private procedures. There is also a view that their 
unwillingness to agree to debt waivers made it difficult to implement radical debt restructuring 
for firms with excessive borrowings. Under such circumstances, private financial institutions 
may have waived debts to mitigate immediate financial problems. Further studies are needed on 
the impact of government-affiliated financial institutions by including sample cases in which 
debt waivers were allowed or the Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan was involved. 
 
V.  Conclusions 
 
   In this paper, I have examined effects of government-affiliated financial institutions on 
corporate debt restructuring. There are two views regarding this subject: the so-called soft 
budget view and the hard budget view. The former holds that public financial institutions in 
general have difficulty committing to refrain from additionally funding distressed firms and 
instead have a strong tendency to allow the continuation of business (i.e., reorganization) for 
even inefficient firms. The latter view holds that public financial institutions should prefer 
corporate liquidation rather than the continuation of business because they are more secured by 
mortgages and more reluctant to forgive debts than private financial institutions. 
   So far, I have examined empirically the role and impact of public financial institutions, 
government-affiliated financial institutions in particular, from the viewpoints of 1) DIP 
financing and 2) selection of bankruptcy procedures for distressed firms. 
      The conclusions of this paper are as follows. 
   In the field of DIP financing, the Development Bank of Japan always takes the lead and is 
followed by private financial institutions. That is, there exists so-called “cowbell effect” which 
would be inconsistent with the hard-budget view. However, it is unclear whether or not the 
Development Bank of Japan is more capable of producing information than private financial 
institutions, because only a few years have passed since the initiation of DIP financing. 
   Next, as for the selection efficiency of a debt restructuring procedure, no large difference 
was observed between firms with borrowings from government-affiliated financial institutions 
and those without, when the choice was limited to legal procedures (Houteki Seiri). The same 
extent of over-liquidation was observed in both cases. Meanwhile, when the choice includes 
private procedures, the tendency was toward private procedures when companies had 172  K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 
borrowings from government-affiliated financial institutions.    As for the selection efficiency, it 
was observed that in some cases private procedures were excessively chosen even when legal 
procedures were more desirable. In this sense, the existence of government-affiliated financial 
institutions may have had the effect of delaying a drastic debt restructuring. This possibility 




   In the model in Section 4, unlike the typical qualitative response model, the data also 
includes the magnitude of corporate value achieved when a certain debt restructuring procedure 
is taken. To put it more precisely, corporate values were calculated by using the total amount of 
dividends in the case of legal liquidation, and the amount of repayment under a reorganization 
plan in the case of legal reorganization or debt waiver. In the case of private reorganization or 
debt waiver, corporate value was estimated by applying the option pricing model. The precise 
calculation procedures are as follows. 
1) Estimation of Corporate Value in Legal Liquidation: 
In the case of legal procedures, when bankruptcy or special liquidation was selected, the 
total amount of repayment (dividends) to the creditors was used as corporate value. 
2) Estimation of Corporate Value in Legal Reorganization: 
In the case of legal procedures, when corporate reorganization (kaisha-kousei), composition 
with creditors, corporate consolidation or civil reorganization (minji-saisei) procedures were 
taken and a reorganization plan was approved, the total scheduled repayment amount of 
preferential (secured) and general (unsecured) claims was used for the corporate value. 
3) Estimation of Corporate Value in Private Reorganization: 
In the case of debt waiver or private reorganization, the total liabilities after the debt 
waiver were regarded as the striking price and the total stock value (market value) of a firm 
was regarded as the call option value, then the corporate value was calculated backward by 
using the Black and Scholes European type option price formula.   
      In 1) and 2), the discount rate for future repayment was assumed to be 0. I simply totaled the 
amounts of repayment in the repayment period of the plan. In 3), I attempted to estimate 
corporate values based on stock market evaluation by using the option theory. Debt waiver by 
financial institutions before bankruptcy has been criticized for not being sufficient in amount 
and for being determined in accordance with the strength of financial institutions. However, 
because the market values of liabilities were also calculated by using the option theory, the 
approach taken in this paper is less problematic than defining corporate value as the sum of the 
face value of liabilities after debt waiver and stock market values. In these estimations, I have 
assumed the interest rate for safe assets to be 0, and maturing in one year, and used the Nikkei   K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 173 
Average Implied Volatility as the underlying asset volatility
16. 




in the above method and their standard deviation. According to this table, the average and the 
standard deviation of the corporate values are low in liquidation-type debt restructuring, while 
both values are high in reorganization–type restructuring. This can be interpreted to mean that 
the larger a company is, the more reorganization-type debt restructuring takes place. 
      Supplemental Table 2 compares corporate values under private procedures in the case where 
the value is calculated by using the option theory, as explained above, and in the case where the 
value is simply calculated by deeming the face value of liabilities after debt waiver as the value 
of the claims, and adding that value to the total stock market value. This table shows that 
sometimes there is almost no difference between the two, but sometimes the difference between 
the two is relatively large. The corporate value is smaller in the option approach.   
 
Supplemental Table 1 : Descriptive Statistics concerning Estimated Corporate Value 





Average  87  390  2574 
Standard Deviation  203  831  2709 
V
L: Corporate value realized under liquidation (bankruptcy or special liquidation cases, 26 companies) 
V
C: Corporate value realized under reorganization (corporate reorganization (kaisha-kousei), civil 
reorganization (minji-saisei) or composition-with-creditors cases, 39 companies) 
V
B: Corporate value realized under reorganization (private procedures/debt waiver cases, 12 companies) 
 
Supplemental Table 2: Comparison of the Face Value of Liabilities and the Market Value of Liabilities 
    100 million yen 
Company 
(anonymous) Face Value of Liabilities  Market Value of Liabilities 
(Option Approach) 
A  2519  2507 
B  522  521 
C  1281  1280 
D  1530  1433 
E  236  235 
F  4791  4776 
G  9332  8343 
H  173  171 
I  2880  2863 
J  5035  4460 
K  2425  2323 
L  173  156 
                                                                            
16    If the volatility of true corporate value is larger than the Nikkei Implied Volatility, option prices become 
larger than corporate values, and, therefore, corporate value estimated in this payer may be over-evaluated. 174  K. Fujiwara / Public Policy Review 
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